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In this paper we study a formal notion of knowledge forgetting in S5 modal logic.
We propose four postulates and prove that these postulates precisely characterize both
semantic and logical properties of knowledge forgetting. We then investigate possible
applications of knowledge forgetting in various epistemic reasoning scenarios. In particular,
we show that different forms of knowledge updates may be represented via knowledge
forgetting. We also demonstrate how knowledge forgetting can be used in formalizing and
reasoning about knowledge games with bounded memory.
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1. Introduction
Epistemic reasoning concerns the problem of how to reason about agents’ epistemic states (knowledge) in a dynamic
environment, e.g. [5,24]. In the last decade, it has been demonstrated that epistemic reasoning has many important appli-
cations in computer science and AI [21,23]. Amongst various theories and approaches, one major assumption in the study
of epistemic reasoning is that agents always remember their previous knowledge (i.e. agents have perfect recall) [9,22].
However, as pointed by Fagin et al.: “There are often scenarios of interest where we want to model the fact that certain information
is discarded. In practice, for example, an agent may simply not have enough memory capacity to remember everything he has learned”
[9, page 129]. Hence knowledge forgetting is an important behaviour for an agent under certain circumstances.
As a logical notion, forgetting was ﬁrst studied in propositional and ﬁrst order logics from a KR perspective by Lin and
Reiter [19]. Over the years, researchers have used the notion of propositional forgetting to deal with issues in abductive
reasoning, belief revision/update, and reasoning about knowledge [17,20,25]. In recent years, theories of forgetting have also
been proposed under the answer set programming semantics and used in solving logic program conﬂicts and updates [8,26].
We can see that forgetting has many applications in knowledge representation and reasoning.
However, existing forgetting deﬁnitions in propositional logic and answer set programming are not directly applicable
in modal logics. For instance, in propositional forgetting theory, forgetting atom q from T ≡ (p → q) ∧ ((q ∧ r) → s) is
equivalent to a formula T [q/] ∨ T [q/⊥], where T [q/] is a formula obtained from T by replacing each q with  and
T [q/⊥] is obtained from T by replacing each q with ⊥, which is (r → s) ∨ ¬p. However, this method cannot be extended
to an S5 modal logic formula. Consider an S5 formula T ′ ≡ ¬Kq ∧¬K¬q. If we want to forget atom q from T ′ by using the
above method, we would have T ′[q/] ∨ T ′[q/⊥] ≡ ⊥. This is obviously not correct because after forgetting q, the agent’s
knowledge set should not become inconsistent!
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Zhang’s work on knowledge update [1], where they treated knowledge forgetting as a special form of update with the effect
¬Kφ ∧¬K¬φ: after knowledge forgetting a propositional formula φ, the agent would neither know φ nor ¬φ.
Recently, van Ditmarsch et al. have also considered the issue of forgetting in a modal logical context [6]. Their forgetting
concept is similar to Baral and Zhang’s forgetting update in the sense that after (knowledge) forgetting atom p the agent
should conclude ¬Kp ∧ ¬K¬p, but based on a dynamic modal logic. They showed that their dynamic modal logic of
forgetting is sound and complete.
While both Baral and Zhang’s and van Ditmarsch et al.’s work have made interesting contributions to formalize the notion
of knowledge forgetting, its underlying semantics still remains unclear. For instance, neither of their knowledge forgetting
notions always results in intuitive solutions. Speciﬁcally, by restricting to classical propositional logic, their forgetting notions
are not consistent with propositional variable forgetting.
In recent modal logic research, notions of bisimulation quantiﬁcation and uniform interpolation have been extensively
studied, which eventually provide semantic and logical interpretations for knowledge forgetting. Based on the notion of
bisimulation quantiﬁcation, French, Ghilardi and Zawadowski deﬁned the semantics of formula ∃V φ [10,12], where V is a
ﬁnite set of propositional atoms and φ is a formula in certain modal logic. Intuitively, an interpretation M is a model of
∃V φ iff there is a model M ′ of φ and M and M ′ are bisimilar with exception over atoms in V , i.e. M and M ′ are V -bisimilar.
Ghilardi et al. studied the notion of uniform interpolation in modal logic, and indicated that S5 has the uniform interpola-
tion property. Informally, this means that for every S5 formula φ and every ﬁnite set V of atoms, there exists an S5 formula
∃V φ which does not contain atoms from V but is logically closest to φ in some sense [13]. It is not diﬃcult to show that
this logical deﬁnition of ∃V φ is equivalent to French’s semantic interpretation of ∃V φ [10].
Nevertheless, two major issues still remain unaddressed. Firstly, it is not clear yet whether we can precisely capture both
semantic and logical interpretations of knowledge forgetting through general principles or postulates, as in the analogous
work in belief revision and update [15]. Secondly, the application of knowledge forgetting to different epistemic reasoning
has not been thoroughly studied. In this paper we propose four general postulates for knowledge forgetting and show that
these four postulates precisely characterize the notion of knowledge forgetting described above in S5 modal logic. We then
focus on the study of applications of knowledge forgetting in various epistemic reasoning scenarios. Speciﬁcally, we study
the relationship between knowledge update and knowledge forgetting, and show that knowledge forgetting may be used as
a ﬂexible notion to represent different forms of knowledge updates. We also demonstrate how knowledge forgetting can be
used in formalizing and reasoning about knowledge games with bounded memory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some logical background and presents a semantic
deﬁnition of knowledge forgetting under our context. Section 3 proves a representation theorem for knowledge forget-
ting and studies other related semantic properties. Section 4 shows that different forms of knowledge updates may be
represented through knowledge forgetting. Section 5 demonstrates an interesting application of knowledge forgetting in
describing knowledge games with bounded memory. Finally Section 6 concludes this paper with some remarks.
2. Deﬁning knowledge forgetting
Our knowledge forgetting will be deﬁned on a basis of propositional modal logic S5. Let Atom be a set of atoms (also
called variables). The language L of propositional S5 modal logic is deﬁned recursively by Atom, classical connectives ⊥, ¬,
⊃ and a modal operator K as follows:
φ ::= ⊥ | p | ¬φ | φ ⊃ ψ | Kφ,
where p ∈ Atom. , φ ∧ψ and φ ∨ψ , are deﬁned as the standard way. Elements in L are called formulas. Formulas without
modal operators are called objective formulas. A knowledge set is a ﬁnite set of formulas. Literals are atoms and their negations.
Let φ be a formula and Γ a knowledge set, we write Var(φ) and Var(Γ ) to denote the sets of atoms occurred in φ and Γ
respectively.
For convenience, we usually use a,b, c, . . . , p,q, . . . to denote atoms; φ, ψ , υ , . . . to denote formulas; and Γ , T , . . . to
denote knowledge sets. Sometimes, we also use the conjunction φ1∧· · ·∧φn to represent a ﬁnite set of formulas {φ1, . . . , φn}.
A Kripke structure is a triple S = 〈W , R, L〉, where W is a set of possible worlds, R an equivalence relation on W , and L
a set of interpretations for each world in W .1 A Kripke interpretation is a pair M = 〈S,w〉 where w ∈ W . As mentioned in
[21], an S5 Kripke interpretation can be simpliﬁed as M = 〈W ,w〉, where W is the set of all possible worlds, each world is
identiﬁed as a set of atoms, and w ∈ W is called the actual world. In this case, we call M = 〈W ,w〉 a k-interpretation.
The satisfaction relation | between k-interpretations and formulas in L is deﬁned recursively as follows2:
(1) 〈W ,w〉 | ⊥;
(2) 〈W ,w〉 | p iff p ∈ w , where p ∈ Atom;
1 In this paper, we will only consider Kripke structures for logic S5 where R is restricted to be an equivalence relation. In the rest of the paper, we will
not explicitly mention this whenever there is no confusion.
2 We write 〈W ,w〉 | F if it is not the case that 〈W ,w〉 | F .
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(4) 〈W ,w〉 | φ ⊃ ψ iff 〈W ,w〉 | φ or 〈W ,w〉 | ψ ;
(5) 〈W ,w〉 | Kφ iff ∀w ′ ∈ W , 〈W ,w ′〉 | φ.
We say that M is a k-model of φ iff M | φ. An S5 formula φ is satisﬁable if it has a k-model. φ is valid if for each
k-interpretation 〈W ,w〉, 〈W ,w〉 | φ. In this case, we also denote | φ. We write Mod(φ) (or Mod(Γ ) if Γ is a ﬁnite set
of formulas) to denote the set of all k-models of φ (or Γ resp.). We say that two S5 formulas (knowledge sets) φ and ψ
are equivalent, denoted by φ ≡ ψ , iff Mod(φ) =Mod(ψ). We denote φ | ψ iff Mod(φ) ⊆Mod(ψ). That is, we treat | as the
local consequence relation in S5.
To present a formal deﬁnition of knowledge forgetting, we need the concepts of bisimulation [2] and bisimulation quan-
tiﬁcation that have been studied in modal logic [10,12]. Let w and w ′ be two worlds identiﬁed as two sets of atoms
respectively, and V ⊆ Atom a set of atoms. We denote w V w ′ if for all p ∈ Atom \ V , p ∈ w iff p ∈ w ′ .
Deﬁnition 1. (See [10].) Let M = 〈W ,w〉 and M ′ = 〈W ′,w ′〉 be two k-interpretations, and V ⊆ Atom a set of atoms. We say
that M and M ′ are V -bisimilar (i.e. bisimilar with exception on V ), denoted by M ↔V M ′ , iff the following conditions hold:
(1) w V w ′;
(2) ∀w∗ ∈ W , ∃w∗′ ∈ W ′ such that w∗ V w∗′ (the forth condition); and
(3) ∀w∗′ ∈ W ′ , ∃w∗ ∈ W such that w∗ V w∗′ (the back condition).
Note that even if M ↔V M ′ , M and M ′ may have different number of worlds.
Proposition 1. Let M1 and M2 be two k-interpretations, V a set of atoms and p an atom. If M1 and M2 are V ∪ {p}-bisimilar, then
there exists a k-interpretation M ′ such that M1 and M ′ are {p}-bisimilar and M ′ and M2 are V -bisimilar.
Proof. Let M1 = 〈W1, s1〉, M2 = 〈W2, s2〉 and M1 V∪{p} M2. We construct a k-interpretation M ′ = 〈W ′, s′〉 as follows:
(1) for all pairs w1 ∈ W1 and w2 ∈ W2 such that w1 V w2, let w ′ ∈ W ′ and (a) p ∈ w ′ iff p ∈ w2, (b) for all atoms q ∈ V ,
q ∈ w ′ iff q ∈ w1, (c) for all other atoms q′ , q′ ∈ w ′ iff q′ ∈ w2 iff q ∈ w1; (2) delete duplicated worlds in W ′; (3) let s′ be
the world such that (a) p ∈ s′ iff p ∈ s2, (b) for all atoms q ∈ V , q ∈ s′ iff q ∈ s1, (c) for all other atoms q′ , q′ ∈ s′ iff q′ ∈ s2 iff
q′ ∈ s1. Then it is easy to verify that M1 ↔{p} M ′ and M ′ ↔V M2. 
The following are also standard results from bisimulation quantiﬁcation [10].
Proposition 2. The relation ↔V is an equivalence relation.
Proposition 3. If two k-interpretations M1 and M2 are V -bisimilar, then they satisfy the same formulas if the latter do not contain
atoms from V.
Now we deﬁne knowledge forgetting as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 (Knowledge forgetting). Let Γ be a knowledge set and V ⊆ Atom a set of atoms. A knowledge set, denoted as
KForget(Γ, V ), is the result of knowledge forgetting V from Γ , if the following condition holds:
Mod
(
KForget(Γ, V )
)= {M ′ | ∃M ∈Mod(Γ ) and M ↔V M ′}.
From Deﬁnition 2, we can see that for each k-model M of Γ , M is a k-model of KForget(Γ, V ). Further, if we simply
add all worlds into M that differ from worlds of M only on the evaluation of variables in V , then the newly formed
k-interpretation M ′ is also a k-model of KForget(Γ, V ).
Example 1. Consider knowledge sets K (p∨q), Kp∨Kq and K (p∧q). From Deﬁnition 2, it is easy to check that KForget(K (p∨
q), {p}) ≡ , KForget(Kp ∨ Kq, {p}) ≡ , and KForget(K (p ∧ q), {p}) ≡ Kq.
We should mention that our knowledge forgetting deﬁnition KForget(Γ, V ) is equivalent to the semantic deﬁnition of
formula ∃VΓ in [10]. It is also equivalent to the notion of uniform interpolation – a logical deﬁnition of formula ∃VΓ
[13]. Ghilardi et al. further described an algorithm to construct formula ∃VΓ (or KForget(Γ, V ) in our context) with double
exponential size of Γ .
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In this section we study essential semantic properties of knowledge forgetting which have not been addressed in previous
work. We will ﬁrst propose a set of postulates and show that these postulates precisely characterize the semantics of
knowledge forgetting. We then discuss other semantic properties of knowledge forgetting. Related computational properties
of knowledge forgetting have been studied in [27].
3.1. A representation theorem
Consider a formula φ. Intuitively, if a propositional variable a does not occur in Var(φ), we may consider that φ is
irrelevant to a. It is not surprising that the notion of irrelevance plays an important role in characterizing the semantics of
knowledge forgetting. We ﬁrst give the following formal deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3 (Irrelevance). Let Γ be a knowledge set and V a set of atoms. We say that Γ is irrelevant to V , denoted by
IR(Γ, V ), if there exists a knowledge set Γ ′ such that Γ ≡ Γ ′ and Var(Γ ′) ∩ V = ∅.
Let Γ and Γ ′ be two knowledge sets and V a set of atoms. Now we propose the following postulates:
(W) Weakening: Γ | Γ ′ .
(PP) Positive Persistence: if IR(φ, V ) and Γ | φ, then Γ ′ | φ.
(NP) Negative Persistence: if IR(φ, V ) and Γ | φ, then Γ ′ | φ.
(IR) Irrelevance: IR(Γ ′, V ).
By specifying Γ ′ ≡ KForget(Γ, V ), (W), (PP), (NP) and (IR) are called postulates for knowledge forgetting. Let us take a
closer look at these postulates. (W) is an essential requirement for knowledge forgetting: after forgetting some informa-
tion from a knowledge set, the resulting knowledge set then becomes weaker. Indeed, as demonstrated in propositional
variable forgetting [19,20], forgetting weakens the original formula. The postulates of positive persistence (PP) and negative
persistence (NP) simply state that knowledge forgetting a set of atoms should not affect those positive or negative infor-
mation respectively that is irrelevant to this set of atoms. Finally, irrelevance (IR) means that after knowledge forgetting,
the resulting knowledge set should be irrelevant to those atoms which we have (knowledge) forgotten. We argue that these
postulates capture the basic properties that knowledge forgetting should satisfy.
Now we have the following representation theorem which states that our forgetting postulates indeed precisely charac-
terize the underlying knowledge forgetting semantics.
Theorem1 (Representation theorem). LetΓ andΓ ′ be two knowledge sets and V ⊆ Atom a set of atoms. Then the following statements
are equivalent:
(1) Γ ′ ≡ KForget(Γ, V );
(2) Γ ′ ≡ {φ | Γ | φ, IR(φ, V )};
(3) Postulates (W), (PP), (NP) and (IR) hold.
Proof. It is observed that 1⇔ 2 is implied by the result that S5 has uniform interpolation property, mentioned in Ghilardi
et al.’s work [13]. 2 ⇒ 3 is obvious from Deﬁnitions 2 and 3. Now we show 3 ⇒ 2. Suppose that all postulates hold. By
Positive Persistence, we have Mod(Γ ′) ⊆ Mod({φ | Γ | φ, IR(φ, V )}). On the other hand, by postulate (IR), we know that
Γ ′ is irrelevant to V . Also note that Γ ′ is a ﬁnite set of formulas. Further from postulate (W), we have Γ | Γ ′ . Therefore,
Γ ′ ∈ {φ | Γ | φ, IR(φ, V )}. So Mod({φ | Γ | φ, IR(φ, V )}) ⊆Mod(Γ ′) holds. 
Theorem 1 is signiﬁcant in the sense that it provides an “if and only if” characterization on knowledge forgetting. That
is, given a knowledge set Γ and a set of atoms V , an S5 formula Γ ′ represents a result of knowledge forgetting V from Γ
if Γ ′ satisﬁes postulates (W), (PP), (NP) and (IR), and vice versa.
Corollary 1. Let Γ be a knowledge base, φ a formula and V a set of atoms. If IR(φ, V ), then KForget(Γ, V ) | φ iff Γ | φ .
3.2. Other semantic properties
As we mentioned in Introduction, the notion of forgetting has been deﬁned and used in a variety of contexts under
propositional logic [16,17,19]. It is important to know the relationship between variable forgetting in propositional logic and
knowledge forgetting in S5 propositional modal logic.
Let φ be an objective formula. We use φ[p/⊥] and φ[p/] to denote the formulas obtained from φ by replacing atom
p with ⊥ and  respectively. Then formula Forget(φ, p) is obtained from φ by forgetting p from φ, if Forget(φ, p) ≡
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where Forget(φ,∅) = φ. We ﬁrst have the following result.
Theorem 2. Let φ be an objective formula and V a set of atoms. Then we have KForget(φ, V ) ≡ Forget(φ, V ) and KForget(Kφ, V ) ≡
K (Forget(φ, V )).
Proof. We prove Result 1 as follows. Suppose that M = 〈W ,w〉 is a k-model of KForget(φ, V ). Then there exists M ′ =
〈W ′,w ′〉 ∈ Mod(φ) such that M ′ ↔V M . Thus, w ′ V w . Since w ′ | φ, w | Forget(φ, V ). Hence, M is also a k-model of
Forget(φ, V ). On the other hand, suppose that M = 〈W ,w〉 is a k-model of Forget(φ, V ). Then there exists w ′ | φ and
w ′ V w . Construct a k-interpretation M ′ = 〈W ′,w ′〉 such that W ′ = W ∪{w ′}\{w}. It’s clear that M ′ is a k-model of φ and
M ′ ↔V M . Hence, M is also a k-model of KForget(φ, V ).
Now consider Result 2. Suppose that M = 〈W ,w〉 is a k-model of KForget(Kφ, V ). Then there exists M ′ = 〈W ′,w ′〉 ∈
Mod(Kφ) such that M ′ ↔V M . We have that for all w ′1 ∈ W ′ , w ′1 | φ. Since M ′ ↔V M , for all w1 ∈ W , there exists w ′1 ∈ W ′
such that w1 V w ′1. Therefore w1 | Forget(φ, V ). This shows that M | K (Forget(φ, V )). On the other hand, suppose
that M = 〈W ,w〉 is a k-model of K (Forget(φ, V )). Then for all w1 ∈ W , w1 | Forget(φ, V ), and there exists w ′1 | φ and
w ′1 V w . Construct a k-interpretation M ′ = 〈W ′,w ′〉 such that W ′ is the set of all w ′1 mentioned above and w ′ V w . It’s
clear that M ′ is a k-model of K (φ) and M ′ ↔V M . Hence, M is also a k-model of KForget(Kφ, V ). 
Theorem 2 simply reveals that propositional variable forgetting is a special case of knowledge forgetting, and also
knowledge forgetting of formulas with the form Kφ (where φ is objective) can be achieved through the corresponding
propositional variable forgetting. The following results further illustrate other essential semantic properties of knowledge
forgetting.
Theorem 3. Let Γ , Γ1 and Γ2 be three knowledge sets, φ1 and φ2 two formulas, and V a set of atoms. Then the following results hold:
(1) KForget(Γ, V ) is satisﬁable iff Γ is satisﬁable;
(2) If Γ1 ≡ Γ2 , then KForget(Γ1, V ) ≡ KForget(Γ2, V );
(3) if Γ1 | Γ2 , then KForget(Γ1, V ) | KForget(Γ2, V );
(4) KForget(φ1 ∨ φ2, V ) ≡ KForget(φ1, V ) ∨ KForget(φ2, V );
(5) KForget(φ1 ∧ φ2, V ) | KForget(φ1, V ) ∧ KForget(φ2, V ).
Proof. To prove Result 1, suppose that M is a k-model of Γ . Then M is also a k-model of KForget(Γ, V ). This shows
that KForget(Γ, V ) is satisﬁable. On the other hand, suppose that Γ is unsatisﬁable. Then, Mod(Γ ) = ∅. It follows that
Mod(KForget(Γ, V )) = ∅.
Result 2 directly follows from Deﬁnition 2 and the fact Mod(Γ1) =Mod(Γ2).
Now we prove Result 3. Suppose that M is a k-model of KForget(Γ1, V ), then there exists a k-model M ′ of Γ1, V such
that M ↔V M ′ . Since Γ1 | Γ2, M ′ is also a k-model of Γ2. Hence, M is a k-model of KForget(Γ2, V ) as well.
To prove Result 4, we need to show Mod(KForget(φ1∨φ2, V )) = Mod(KForget (φ1, V ) ∨ KForget(φ2, V )). Suppose that M
is a k-model of KForget(φ1 ∨ φ2, V ), then there exists a k-model M0 of φ1 ∨ φ2 such that M0 ↔V M . Since M0 is a k-model
of φ1 ∨ φ2, M0 is a k-model of φ1 or φ2. Without loss of generality, suppose that M0 is a k-model of φ1. We have that M is
a k-model of KForget(φ1, V ). Thus, M is a k-model of KForget(φ1, V ) ∨ KForget(φ2, V ).
On the other hand, suppose that M as a k-model of KForget(φ1, V ) ∨ KForget(φ2, V ), then M is a k-model of
KForget(φ1, V ) or a k-model of KForget(φ2, V ). Without loss of generality, suppose that M is a k-model of KForget(φ1, V ),
then there exists a k-model M0 of φ such that M0 ↔V M . M0 is also a k-model of φ1 ∨ φ2. Thus, M is a k-model of
KForget(φ1 ∨ φ2, V ).
Finally we prove Result 5. Suppose that M is a k-model of KForget(φ1 ∧ φ2, V ), then there exists a k-model M0 of
φ1 ∧ φ2 such that M0 ↔V M . Therefore, M0 is a k-model of φ1. Thus, M is also a k-model of KForget(φ1, V ). Similarly, M is
a k-model of KForget(φ2, V ) as well. 
We note that the converse of Result 5 in Theorem 3 does not hold generally. For instance, let φ be q ≡ p and ψ be q ≡ r.
Then, KForget(φ ∧ ψ, {p}) is equivalent to q ≡ r, while KForget(φ, {p}) ∧ KForget(ψ, {p}) ≡ .
4. Knowledge forgetting and knowledge update
As we discussed in Section 1, knowledge forgetting and knowledge update represent two different perspectives of mod-
eling an agent’s knowledge change. In this section, we show that knowledge forgetting can be also used as a ﬂexible logical
notion to represent various knowledge updates. In the rest of this section, we will ﬁrst compare our knowledge forgetting
with Baral and Zhang’s knowledge update, and then provide two different methods to deﬁne knowledge update operators
via knowledge forgetting. We will also restrict our underlying language to be ﬁnite, in order to relate our knowledge update
to traditional update postulates [15].
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Traditional belief revision and update are based on classical propositional logic, e.g. [11,18]. Recently, Baral and Zhang
studied the theory of update based on the ﬁnite propositional S5 modal logic, which they called knowledge update [1]. They
considered knowledge forgetting is a special kind of update called forgetting update. In particular, let Γ be a knowledge set,
and φ an objective formula, then in Baral and Zhang’s update formulation, knowledge forgetting φ from Γ is achieved by
performing the forgetting update Γ  (¬Kφ∧¬K¬φ). Intuitively, this means that after knowledge forgetting φ, the resulting
knowledge set will not entail any knowledge about φ: neither knowing φ nor knowing ¬φ.
Since Baral and Zhang’s knowledge update deals with arbitrary propositional formulas while ours only considers atoms,
we ﬁrst restrict their forgetting update on atoms in order to make these two formulations comparable. We use notion
Γ BZ (¬Ka∧¬K¬a) to denote the result of forgetting update on atom a from Γ by using Baral and Zhang’s approach. Then
from Proposition 7 in [1], Γ BZ (¬Ka∧¬K¬a) can be deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 4 (Baral and Zhang’s forgetting update). (See [1].) A k-interpretation M ′ = 〈W ′,w ′〉 ∈Mod(Γ BZ (¬Ka∧¬K¬a)) iff
there exists a k-model M = 〈W ,w〉 of Γ such that
(1) w ′ = w;
(2) W ′ = W ∪ {w∗}, where (a) a /∈ w∗ if M | Ka, or (b) a ∈ w∗ if M | K¬a;
(3) W ′ = W if M | Ka and M | K¬a.
Example 2. Suppose Γ ≡ Kb ∧ (Ka ∨ K¬a). Let w0 = {a,b}, w1 = {b}, w2 = {a} and w3 = ∅. Clearly, Γ has two k-models:
M0 = 〈{w0},w0〉 and M1 = 〈{w1},w1〉. Using Deﬁnition 4, it is observed that Γ BZ (¬Ka ∧ ¬K¬a) has four k-models:
M ′0 = 〈{w0,w1},w0〉, M ′1 = 〈{w0,w3},w0〉, M ′2 = 〈{w0,w1},w1〉 and M ′3 = 〈{w1,w2},w1〉.
By applying knowledge forgetting deﬁnition (i.e. Deﬁnition 2), we can see that Mod(KForget(Γ, {a})) contains k-models
M0, M1, M ′0, and M ′2, from which we conclude that KForget(Γ, {a}) ≡ Kb.
From Example 2, we can see that even for this simple case, our knowledge forgetting is different from Baral and Zhang’s
forgetting update. In the above example, we also observe Γ BZ (¬Ka∧¬K¬a) | Kb although from our intuition knowledge
forgetting a should not affect the agent’s knowledge about b. In general we have the following result.
Proposition 4. Baral and Zhang’s forgetting update deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4 does not satisfy forgetting postulates (W), (PP), (NP),
and (IR).
Proposition 4 suggests that specifying knowledge forgetting based on knowledge update, as the way proposed in [1],
cannot capture the desired properties of forgetting.
4.2. Representing knowledge update via knowledge forgetting
Although Baral and Zhang’s forgetting update does not satisfy our forgetting postulates (W), (PP) and (NP), their knowl-
edge update satisﬁes traditional Katsuno and Mendelzon’s update postulates (U1)–(U8) [1,15]. In the following, we consider
how we can represent knowledge update through the notion of knowledge forgetting and whether such knowledge update
satisﬁes these postulates. Firstly, we provide Katsuno and Mendelzon’s update postulates as follows.
(U1) Γ  φ | φ.
(U2) If Γ | φ, then Γ  φ ≡ Γ .
(U3) If both Γ and φ are satisﬁable, then Γ  φ is also satisﬁable.
(U4) If Γ1 ≡ Γ2 and φ1 ≡ φ2, then Γ1  φ1 ≡ Γ2  φ2.
(U5) (Γ  φ) ∧ ψ | Γ  (φ ∧ ψ).
(U6) If Γ  φ | ψ and Γ  ψ | φ, then Γ  φ ≡ Γ  ψ .
(U7) If Γ has a unique k-model, then (Γ  φ) ∧ (Γ  ψ) | Γ  (φ ∨ ψ).
(U8) (Γ1 ∨ Γ2)  φ ≡ (Γ1  φ) ∨ (Γ2  φ).
A straightforward way to deﬁne knowledge update via forgetting seems as follows. Let Γ be a knowledge set and μ a
satisﬁable S5 formula. Γ is updated by μ, denoted as Γ k1 μ, is a formula satisfying the following condition:
Mod(Γ k1 μ) =
⋃
Vmin
Mod
(
KForget(Γ, Vmin) ∧μ
)
, (1)
where Vmin ⊆ Var(Γ ) is a minimal subset of Var(Γ ) such that KForget(Γ, Vmin) ∧μ is consistent.
Under the deﬁnition of k1 , the update of Γ with formula μ is achieved by knowledge forgetting all minimal subsets of
atoms Vmin from Γ while keeping KForget(Γ , Vmin) ∧ μ consistent.
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and μ ≡ ¬Ka ∧ ¬K¬a. As shown in Example 2, Γ BZ μ has four k-models: M ′0 = 〈{w0,w1},w0〉, M ′1 = 〈{w0,w3},w0〉,
M ′2 = 〈{w0,w1},w1〉 and M ′3 = 〈{w1,w2},w1〉.
Now we consider Γ k1 μ. Clearly, Vmin = {a} is the only minimal set of atoms that retains KForget(Γ, Vmin) ∧ μ to be
consistent. So we have KForget(Γ, Vmin) ≡ Kb and hence Γ k1 μ ≡ Kb ∧ ¬Ka ∧ ¬K¬a, which has two k-models M ′1 =〈{{a,b}, {b}}, {a,b}〉 and M ′2 = 〈{{a,b}, {b}}, {b}〉.
Theorem 4. Knowledge operator k1 satisﬁes Katsuno and Mendelzon’s update postulates (U1)–(U7), but does not satisfy postulate
(U8).
Proof. It is easy to show that k1 satisﬁes (U1)–(U4). Now we prove (U5). Suppose that M is a k-model of (Γ k1 φ)∧ψ . Then
there exists V which is minimal and M is a k-model of KForget(Γ, V ) ∧ φ. Thus, M is a k-model of KForget(Γ, V ) ∧ φ ∧ ψ .
Therefore V is also a minimal set of atoms such that KForget(Γ, V ) ∧ φ ∧ ψ is consistent. This shows that M is also a
k-model of Γ k1 (φ ∧ ψ).
Now we prove (U6). Suppose that M is a k-model of Γ k1 φ. Then, M is also a k-model of ψ . There exists V
which is minimal and M is a k-model of KForget(Γ, V ) ∧ φ. Therefore M is a k-model of KForget(Γ, V ) ∧ ψ . This shows
that KForget(Γ, V ) ∧ ψ is consistent. Moreover, V is also the minimal set. Otherwise, suppose that V1 ⊂ V such that
KForget(Γ, V1) ∧ ψ is consistent as well. Then, KForget(Γ, V1) ∧ φ should also be consistent, which contradicts to the fact
that V is the minimal set of atoms such that KForget(Γ, V ) ∧ ψ is consistent. Hence, M is also a k-model of Γ k1 ψ .
Similarly, if M is a k-model of Γ k1 ψ , it is a k-model of Γ k1 φ too.
Now we prove (U7). Suppose that Γ has the unique k-model M and M1 is the k-model of both Γ k1 φ and Γ k1 ψ . Then
there exist V1 and V2 which are minimal such that M1 is a k-model of both KForget(Γ, V1) ∧ φ and KForget(Γ, V2) ∧ ψ .
Thus, M1 ↔V1 M and M1 ↔V2 M . Therefore M1 ↔V1∩V2 M . Thus, M1 is a k-model of KForget(Γ, V1 ∩ V2). Therefore V1 =
V2, otherwise V1 (or V2) is not the minimal set. M1 is a k-model of KForget(Γ, V1) ∧ (φ ∨ ψ) as well. Moreover, V1 is the
minimal set such that KForget(Γ, V1) ∧ (φ ∨ ψ) is satisﬁable. Otherwise, suppose that V3 ⊂ V1 such that KForget(Γ, V3) ∧
(φ ∨ ψ) is satisﬁable. Then KForget(Γ, V3) ∧ φ or KForget(Γ, V3) ∧ ψ is satisﬁable. Without loss of generality, suppose that
KForget(Γ, V3)∧φ is satisﬁable, then V1 is not the minimal set, a contradiction. So M1 is also a k-model of KForget(Γ, V3)∧
(φ ∨ ψ).
As a counterexample of (U8), let Γ1 and Γ2 be p ∧ q ∧ r and p ∧ ¬r respectively, and φ be ¬p ∧ ¬q. We have that
(Γ1 ∨Γ2) k1 φ is KForget((p ∧ q∧ r)∨ (p ∧¬r), p)∧ (¬p ∧¬q), which is equivalent to ¬p ∧¬q∧¬r. However, (Γ1 k1 φ)∨
(Γ2 k1 φ) is (KForget(p∧q∧ r, {p,q})∧ (¬p∧¬q))∨ (KForget(p∧¬r, p)∧ (¬p∧¬q)), which is equivalent to ¬p∧¬q. They
are not equivalent to each other.
Theorem 4 reveals that the knowledge update speciﬁed through knowledge forgetting in such a way of (1) does not
precisely capture the update semantics. This is not very surprising, because from the deﬁnition of operator k1 , we observe
that k1 seems not to be associated to any Γ ’s k-model based pre-ordering (see Theorem 3.4 in [15]).
In the following, we will propose another method of deﬁning knowledge update via knowledge forgetting which will
satisfy all postulates (U1)–(U8). For this purpose, we ﬁrst specify a formula which completely characterizes a given (ﬁnite)
k-interpretation. Let π be an interpretation and V a ﬁnite set of atoms, the characteristic formula of π on V , denoted by
C(π, V ), is deﬁned as:
∧
a∈π,a∈V
a∧
∧
b/∈π,b∈V
¬b.
It is clear that π | C(π, V ).
Now consider a (ﬁnite) k-interpretation M = 〈W ,w〉 and a ﬁnite set V of atoms. Then the characteristic formula of M on
V , denoted by C(M, V ), is deﬁned as:
C(w, V ) ∧
∧
{w ′∈W }
¬K¬C(w ′, V ) ∧
∧
{∀w ′′∈2Atom∧w ′′ /∈W , ∃w∗∈Ws.t.w ′′↔Atom\V w∗}
K¬C(w ′′, V ).
It is not diﬃcult to see that M | C(M, V ). We can also prove that for any k-interpretation M ′ , M ′ | C(M, V ) iff
M ′ ↔Atom\V M .
Deﬁnition 5. Let Γ be a knowledge set and μ a satisﬁable formula. The knowledge update operator k2 is deﬁned as
follows:
Mod(Γ k2 μ) =
⋃
M∈Mod(Γ )
⋃
Vmin
Mod
(
KForget
(
C(M,Atom), Vmin
)∧μ), (2)
where C(M,Atom) is the characteristic formula of M , and Vmin ⊆ Atom is a minimal subset of atoms that makes
KForget(C(M,Atom), Vmin) ∧μ consistent.
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by minimally changing every k-model of Γ to make it consistent with μ. Note that the characteristic formula C(M,Atom)
is the syntactic representation of model M , and KForget(C(M,Atom), Vmin) guarantees the change of M is minimal with
respect to μ.
By comparing (1) and (2), we can see the difference between these two knowledge update deﬁnitions: in (1) the minimal
set Vmin of forgotten atoms does not depend on any particular k-model of Γ , while in (2), each k-model of Γ has a
corresponding minimal set of forgotten atoms.
Now we can deﬁne a partial ordering over the set of k-interpretations that links to knowledge operator k2 . Let M,M1,
and M2 be three k-interpretations. We say that M1 is at least as close to M as M2 is, denoted by M1 M M2, iff for any
V2 ⊆ Atom such that M2 ↔V2 M , there exists a V1 ⊆ Atom such that M1 ↔V1 M and V1 ⊆ V2. We denote M1 <M M2 iff
M1 M M2 and M2 M M1.
Proposition 5. Let M be a k-interpretation. Then M deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5 is a partial ordering.
Let M be a collection of all k-interpretations and M a k-interpretation, we use Min(M, M) to denote the set of all
minimal k-interpretations with respect to ordering M . Then we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Let Γ be a knowledge set and μ a satisﬁable S5 formula. Then Mod(Γ k2 μ) =
⋃
M∈Mod(Γ ) Min(Mod(μ),M).
Proof. Consider a k-model M ′ ∈ Mod(Γ k2 μ). We show that there exists some M ∈ Mod(Γ ) such that M ′ ∈ Min(Mod(μ),
M). Deﬁnition 5, we know that there exists some M ∈Mod(Γ ) such that M ′ ∈⋃Vmin Mod(KForget(C(M,Atom), Vmin) ∧μ).
Further, there is a particular V ′min ⊆ Atom such that M ′ ↔V ′min M and M ′ ∈ Mod(μ). Since such V ′min is a minimal subset
of Atom satisfying these properties, it concludes that for any other k-model M ′′ of μ, we have M ′ M M ′′ , that is M ′ ∈
Min(Mod(μ),M).
Now we consider a k-model M ′ ∈⋃M∈Mod(Γ ) Min(Mod(μ),M). Then there exists some M ∈ Mod(Γ ) such that M ′ ∈
Min(Mod(μ),M). Let Vmin be a minimal subset of atoms such that M ′ ↔Vmin M . Then according to the deﬁnition of M ,
we know that there does not exist another k-model M ′′ ∈ Mod(μ) such that M ′′ ↔V ′′ M and V ′′ ⊂ Vmin . This follows that
M ′ ∈Mod(KForget(C(M,Atom), Vmin) ∩ Mod(μ). So M ′ ∈Mod(Γ k2 μ). 
From Theorem 5, we can show that the following result holds for k2 .
Theorem 6. Knowledge update operator k2 satisﬁes Katsuno and Mendelzon’s update postulates (U1)–(U8).
Example 4. Consider a knowledge set Γ ≡ K (a ∧ b ∧ c) ∨ K (a ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬c), and a formula μ ≡ K¬a ∧ K¬b. Now we ﬁrst
consider the update of Γ with μ under the operator k1 . It is easy to see that Vmin = {a} is the only minimal set of atoms
that makes KForget(Γ, Vmin) ∧μ consistent. That is, we have Γ k1 μ ≡ K¬a∧ K¬b ∧ K¬c.
Now we consider the same update under operator k2 . Since Γ has two k-models: M1 = 〈{{a,b, c}}, {a,b, c}〉 and
M2 = 〈{{a}}, {a}〉, Mod(KForget (C(M1, {a, b, c}), {a,b}) ∧ (K¬a∧ K¬b)) contains a unique k-interpretation M ′1 = 〈{{c}}, {c}〉,
where Vmin = {a,b} is the only minimal set of atoms that makes KForget(C(M1, {a,b, c}), Vmin) ∧ (K¬a ∧ K¬b) consistent,
and Mod(KForget (C(M2, {a,b, c}), {a}) ∧ (K¬a ∧ K¬b)) contains a unique k-interpretation M ′2 = 〈{∅},∅〉. This gives that
Mod(Γ k2 μ) = {M ′1,M ′2}. That is, Γ k2 μ ≡ K¬a∧ K¬b ∧ (Kc ∨ K¬c).
Comparing the results of Γ k1 μ ≡ K¬a ∧ K¬b ∧ K¬c and Γ k2 μ ≡ K¬a ∧ K¬b ∧ (Kc ∨ K¬c), it seems that the later
gives a more intuitive knowledge update solution: since Γ | Kc∨ K¬c, and atom c does not occurs in μ, we would expect
that the resulting knowledge set still entails Kc ∨ K¬c. This is true for Γ k2 μ but not for Γ k1 μ.
It is worth mentioning that knowledge update operator k2 is deﬁned in a spirit of the traditional possible models
approach (PMA), but under S5 model semantics. By restricting to a propositional language, k2 coincides with Doherty et
al.’s propositional belief update operator [7,14] – a modiﬁed version of PMA.
5. A knowledge game with bounded memory
As indicated by Fagin et al. [9], there are scenarios where an agent may have to forget some facts that he knows
previously. To show how such a scenario can be modeled using the theory of knowledge forgetting, in this section we study
a speciﬁc knowledge game with bounded memories in a ﬁnite language. The issue of knowledge games has been extensively
studied by van Ditmarsch [3], in which information contained in a game state and information change due to a game action
are speciﬁcally considered. While memory is usually not an issue in knowledge games, i.e. each agent will never forget his
knowledge during a game play, here we will consider that in a game, the player only has bounded memory, therefore in
order to continue his play in a game, he may have to forget some of his previous knowledge.
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The knowledge game we consider here is a simple card game over a ﬁnite domain with only one player. The game is
described informally as follows. There are N different cards, each with a number from 1 to N (the player knows that).
Before the game starts, these N cards are facing down on the table so that the player cannot see the numbers on these
cards. Then the player starts the game by picking up cards from the table, one at a time (of course the player then can see
the numbers on the cards he is holding).
However, the player can at most hold M cards at the same time (M < N). That is, if the player already holds M cards
and wants to continue the game, he has to discard one or more cards in order to pick up a new card from the table. The
discarded cards then cannot be used any more. The player may pick up at most P cards (M  P  N) during a game. The
game terminates if the player stops the game (e.g. the player has realised that he has won the game), or the player has
exhausted all his P cards. The player wins the game if when the game terminates, the player holds M cards and these
cards have such a property: sum ∈ X , where sum is the sum of all numbers on these M cards, and X is a set of integers.3
Otherwise, the player loses the game.
Although this card game looks similar to those proposed by van Ditmarsch, such as Pit [4], what makes this one dif-
ferent from other card games (knowledge games), is that the player has a bounded memory which leads him to only have
imperfect recall. That is, during a game, once the player discards a card, he will forget the number on that card. Then such
forgetting will inﬂuence the player’s current knowledge about the game. We call a game like this a memory bounded card
game, and denote as GN,M,PX , where parameters N,M, P and X are as described above.
5.2. Game states, game actions and game instances
In the following, we will formalize this card game. In particular, we consider game G5,2,3{6,7} . That is, there are 5 cards
named a, b, c, d and e, each with a number from 1 to 5, the player can only hold 2 cards at the same time, and the player
can at most pick up 3 cards altogether. The player wins the game if, at the end, he holds two cards having sum of 6 or 7.
Results presented in this section can be extended to general cases.
In our formalism, atoms a,b, c,d, e denote that the player holds cards a,b, c,d, e respectively, and atoms suma+b = 3,
suma+c = 4, . . . , sumd+e = 9 denote the sums of cards a and b, a and c, . . . , d and e respectively. Finally atoms guess(a) = 1,
guess(a) = 2, . . . , are used to denote that the player’s guess of card a’s number is 1, 2, . . . .
For convenience, we also introduce meta variables in our descriptions such as x, y, . . . , and n,n(x),n(y),n(x + y), . . . ,
where x, y, . . . , are cards from {a,b, c,d, e}, n,n(x),n(y), . . . , are cards’ numbers from {1,2,3,4,5}, and n(x + y), . . . , are
sums of two cards x and y from {3, . . . ,9} respectively. In this way, we may write guess(x) = n, ¬guess(y) = n(x), sumx+y =
n(x+ y) and so on to express that the player’s guess on card x’s number is n, the player will never guess card y’s number
is the same as card x’s number, the sum of cards x and y’s numbers is n(x+ y), etc.
A game state in a G5,2,3{6,7} game is a k-interpretation (W ,w), where W is the set of all worlds that the player thinks
possible, and w is the actual world where the player is. Since we are formalizing the situation from the player’s viewpoint
where the player does not know his actual world w , here we may simply refer W to the game state. In an arbitrary G5,2,3{6,7}
game, the player will always start the same initial state: he has no card in hand, and all cards are on the table. Formally, we
specify the initial game state Winit of a G5,2,3{6,7} game to be the set of worlds, where w ∈ Winit iff w |
∧
x∈{a,b,c,d,e}(guess(x) =
1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ guess(x) = 5) ∧∧x∈{a,b,c,d,e} ¬x.4 Note that if w ∈ Winit , then for any other world w ′ such that w ′ V w , where
V = {suma+b = 3, . . . , sumd+e = 9}, w ′ ∈ Winit .
In a G5,2,3{6,7} game, the player can take three kinds of game actions: pick up a card, discard a card, and stop the game. For
a given game state W , a game state W ′ is a successor game state (or simply called successor state) of W if W ′ represents a
game state resulting from W by taking one of the three game actions, denoted as W ′ = succ(W ,α), where
α ∈ Action = {pickup(a), . . . ,pickup(e), . . . ,discard(a), . . . ,discard(e), stop}.
The following task is to specify succ(W ,α) for a given W and α. Towards this aim, we ﬁrst introduce a useful notion.
Let y1, y2, y3, and y4 be four different cards from {a,b, c,d, e}, X and Y two proper subsets of {1,2,3,4,5} such that
0  |X |  2 and 0  |Y |  1. Then we use τ (y1, y2, y3)|{1,2,3,4,5}−X (or τ (y1, y2, y3, y4)|{1,2,3,4,5}−Y ) to denote an
arbitrary guess of the numbers on cards y1, y2 and y3 (or y1, y2, y3, and y4, resp.) from {1,2,3,4,5} but not including
any numbers from X (or Y resp.). For instance, the following are two possible guesses:
τ (c,d, e)|{1,2,3,4,5}−{2} = {guess(c) = 1, guess(d) = 3, guess(e) = 4},
τ (b, c,d, e)|{1,2,3,4,5}−{1} = {guess(b) = 3, guess(c) = 2, guess(d) = 4, guess(e) = 5}.
3 We assume that among the given N cards, there exists at least one collection of M different cards satisfying this property.
4 Here ⊕ is exclusive or.
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{a,b, c,d, e}, are deﬁned as:
(1) There are two cases for specifying succ(W ,pickup(x)):
(a) if ∀w ∈ W ,∃y ∈ w , where y ∈ {a,b, c,d, e} \ {x}, then
succ
(
W ,pickup(x)
)= {w∗ | ∀w ∈ W such that (guess(x) = n(x), sumx+y = n(x+ y) ∈ w),
w∗ = w ∪ {x} \ {guess(x) = n(x)}};
(b) if ∀w ∈ W ,  ∃y ∈ w , where y ∈ {a,b, c,d, e} \ {x}, then
succ
(
W ,pickup(x)
)= {w∗ | ∀w ∈ W such that (guess(x) = n(x) ∈ w),w∗ = w ∪ {x} \ {guess(x) = n(x)}};
(2) There are two cases for specifying succ(W ,discard(x)):
(a) if ∀w ∈ W ,∃y ∈ w , where y ∈ {a,b, c,d, e} \ {x}, then
succ
(
W ,discard(x)
)= {w∗ | w∗ = {y, τ (y1, y2, y3)|{1,2,3,4,5}−{n(y)}}∪ X, where
y1, y2, y3 ∈ {a,b, c,d, e} \ {x, y}, and X is any subset of {suma+b = 3, . . . , sumd+e = 9}
};
(b) if ∀w ∈ W ,  ∃y ∈ w , where y ∈ {a,b, c,d, e} \ {x}, then
succ
(
W ,discard(x)
)= {w∗ | w∗ = {τ (y1, y2, y3, y4)|{1,2,3,4,5}−∅}∪ X, where
y1, y2, y3, y4 ∈ {a,b, c,d, e} \ {x} and X is any subset of {suma+b = 3, . . . , sumd+e = 9}
};
(3) succ(W , stop) = W .
Let us take a closer look at condition (1) in Deﬁnition 6. Consider the deﬁnition of succ(W ,pickup(a)) ﬁrst. Suppose
the current game state of the player is W , in which the player already holds one card, say card b for example. Then after
the player picks up card a, the player should hold both cards a and b, and thus the player also knows the sum suma+b
of a and b. At this time, the player does not guess the number on card a any more, but still has to guess other cards’
numbers that are not in his hand. Condition (1.a) in Deﬁnition 6 exactly captures this intuition. If the player does not hold
any card at the state W , then after picking up card a, the only information change is that the player does not guess card
a’s number, while other information represented in W does not change, as condition (1.b) in Deﬁnition 6 shows. A similar
explanation follows for condition (2). Finally, since there is no information change when the player stops the game, we have
succ(W , stop) = W .
Deﬁnition 7 (Game instance). A game instance of G5,2,3{6,7} is a ﬁnite sequence of game states associating with a sequence of
game actions:
I = 〈W1,W2, . . . ,Wk〉|α1 · α2 · · ·αk−1,
where W1 = Winit , and for each i (1 i < k), Wi+1 = succ(Wi,αi) for some αi ∈ Action.
In Deﬁnition 7, we call Wk the ﬁnal game state of instance I . Note that if the player stops the game, then we always
have Wk = succ(Wk−1, stop) = Wk−1. However, the game may also terminate if the player has exhausted his three cards. For
a given S5 formula φ and a game instance I , we also write W |I φ if W | φ and W is a game state in I .
Example 5. The following is a game instance for game G5,2,3{6,7} :
I1 = 〈W1,W2,W3,W4,W5,W6〉|pickup(a) · pickup(b) · discard(a) · pickup(c) · stop.
It is easy to see that W6 |I1 Ksumb+c = 5, from which we know that the player loses the game in I1.
5.3. Knowledge characteristic of game G5,2,3{6,7}
We have provided a semantic description for knowledge game G5,2,3{6,7} by using k-interpretations. To reason about the
player’s knowledge in a game instance, we would also prefer a logical account to characterize this semantic description, so
that reasoning about the player’s knowledge can be carried over at a logical level.
Since we deal with a ﬁnite language, from a given game state W , we always can construct a knowledge set T that
completely characterizes the information represented in W . That is, for any S5 formula ϕ , we will have
W | ϕ iff T | ϕ, (3)
as shown in [3]. However, such construction will make T exponentially large – the same size of W . As an alternative, we
would like to deﬁne such knowledge set T in a succinct and syntactic way. But having a succinct characteristic of a game
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which is weaker than (3) but still effective enough for our purpose.
A formula is called knowledge formula if it is of the form Kφ where φ is objective. Under our knowledge game extent,
although arbitrary S5 formulas will be used in describing game constraints and states (see the following), we can see that
mainly knowledge formulas are of interests in reasoning about the player’s knowledge in a game instance.
Deﬁnition 8 (Knowledge characteristic). Let T be a knowledge set and W a k-interpretation.5 T is called a knowledge charac-
teristic of W if for any knowledge formula Kφ, T | Kφ if and only if W | Kφ.
Obviously, if T is a knowledge characteristic of W , T can be viewed as a complete characterization of W in terms of
knowledge formulas. We say that a k-interpretation W is a maximal k-model of T , if W ∈ Mod(T ) and there does not exist
another k-model W ′ ∈ Mod(T ) such that W ⊂ W ′ (i.e. proper set inclusion). Then the following theorem is important for
identifying a knowledge characteristic for a given k-interpretation.
Theorem 7. Let T be a knowledge set and W a k-interpretation. Then T is a knowledge characteristic of W if W is the unique maximal
k-model of T .
Proof. Suppose W is the unique maximal k-model of T . Since W ∈ Mod(T ), then for any formula Kφ where φ is propo-
sitional, T | Kφ implies W | Kφ. Now consider that T | Kφ. In this case, there must be some k-model of T , say
W ′ ∈ Mod(T ), such that W ′ | Kφ. Since W is the unique maximal k-model of T , we have W ′ ⊆ W . This follows that
W | Kφ.
Deﬁnition 9 (Knowledge characteristic of instance). Let I = 〈W1, . . . ,Wk〉| α1 · · · αk−1 be an instance of game G5,2,3{6,7} , and
T = 〈T1, . . . , Tk〉 a sequence of knowledge sets. We say that T is a knowledge characteristic of instance I if for each i
(1 i  k), Ti is a knowledge characteristic of game state Wi .
In the following, we will show that we can use our knowledge forgetting effectively deﬁne such T mentioned in Deﬁni-
tion 9. We ﬁrst specify a knowledge set Tc consisting of game constraints as follows:
holdCard ≡
∧
x∈{a,b,c,d,e}
(
x→
(
Kx∧
∧
n∈{1,2,3,4,5}
K¬guess(x) = n∧
∧
y∈{a,b,c,d,e},y =x
K¬guess(y) = n(x)
))
,
knowSum ≡
∧
x,y∈{a,b,c,d,e},x=y
(
Kx∧ K y → Ksumx+y = n(x+ y)
)
,
know_not_holdCard ≡
∧
x∈{a,b,c,d,e}
(¬x→ K¬x),
not_knowSum ≡
∧
x∈{a,b,c,d,e}
(
¬x→
∧
y∈{a,b,c,d,e},y =x
¬Ksumx+y = n(x+ y)
)
,
guessCard ≡
∧
x,y∈{a,b,c,d,e},x=y,n∈{1,2,3,4,5}
K¬(guess(x) = n∧ guess(y) = n).
Tc represents basic game constraints that every game state in any game instance should satisfy. The intuitive meaning of
these formulas is quite obvious. For instance, holdCard states that if the player holds a card, then he knows that he is
holding that card. In this case the player will not need to guess the card’s number, and also the player should then not
guess this card’s number for other cards. knowSum says that if the player has held two cards, then he knows the sum of
these two cards’ numbers. On the other hand, not_knowSum indicates that if the player does not hold a card, then the player
does not know the sum of this card’s number with any other card’s numbers. Finally, guessCard simply says that the player
will never guess two cards with the same number.
Now we specify T0 to be a knowledge set consisting of the following formulas:
∧
x∈{a,b,c,d,e}
¬x, and
∧
x∈{a,b,c,d,e}
K
( ⊕
n∈{1,2,3,4,5}
guess(x) = n
)
,
and let Tinit = T0 ∧ Tc be the initial knowledge set that represents the initial game state Winit for any game instances.
Proposition 6. Tinit is a knowledge characteristic of Winit .
5 As we mentioned earlier, the actual world in a k-interpretation is not interested to represent a game state.
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Tinit = T0 ∧ Tc , it is easy to see that for any k-model W of Tinit and each world w ∈ W , w must contain one of the following
variables from {guess(a) = n1, guess(b) = n2, guess(c) = n3, guess(d) = n4, guess(e) = n5}, where ni ∈ {1,2,3,4,5}; w does
not contain any variables from {a,b, c,d, e}; and w may or may not contain variables from {suma+b = 3, . . . , sumd+e = 9}.
This means that each world w ∈ W is also in Winit . So Winit is the unique maximal k-model of Tinit . 
Suppose that a given T is a knowledge characteristic of some game state W , and W ′ = succ(W ,α) is a successor state
of W by taking action α. Then by using knowledge forgetting, we can derive a new knowledge set T ′ from T which is also
a knowledge characteristic of W ′ . To begin with, we ﬁrst introduce the following notions:

(x) = {x} ∪
⋃
n∈{1,2,3,4,5}
{
guess(x) = n}∪ ⋃
y∈{a,b,c,d,e},y =x
{
sumx+y = n(x+ y)
}
, and
Θ(x) = 
(x) ∪
⋃
y∈{a,b,c,d,e}\{x},n∈{1,2,3,4,5}
{
guess(y) = n}.
Intuitively, 
(x) is the set of atoms that contains card x and other atoms that are directly associated to x, while Θ(x)
contains some extra atoms whose truth values may be affected by discarding card x. Now we further specify a formula:
persist
(
T , {x})= ∧
y∈{a,b,c,d,e}\{x}
((
T →
⊕
n∈{1,2,3,4,5}
guess(y) = n
)
→
⊕
n∈{1,2,3,4,5}
guess(y) = n
)
.
The intuitive meaning of persist(T , {x}) is that if at some game state (that is characterized by T ) the player has a guess for
any card from {a,b, c,d, e} \ {x}, then the player should also have a guess for this card after discarding card x.
Deﬁnition 10 (Action-derived knowledge set). Let T be a knowledge set and α an action. T ′ is called an action-derived knowl-
edge set by applying α to T , if and only if T ′ is deﬁned as follows:
(1) If α = pickup(x), where x ∈ {a,b, c,d, e}, then
T ′ = KForget(T ,
(x))∧ x∧ Tc;
(2) If α = discard(x), where x ∈ {a,b, c,d, e}, then
T ′ = KForget(T ,Θ(x))∧¬x ∧
n∈{1,2,3,4,5}
K
(¬guess(x) = n)∧ Kpersist(T , {x})∧ Tc;
(3) If α = stop, then T ′ = T .
Now we have the following result showing that the action-derived knowledge set deﬁned in Deﬁnition 10 forms a
knowledge characteristic for any game instance of G5,3,2{6,7} .
Theorem8. Let I = 〈W1, . . . ,Wk〉|α1 ·α2 · · ·αk−1 be an instance of game G5,2,3{6,7} , and T = 〈T1, . . . , Tk〉 a sequence of knowledge sets,
where T1 = Tinit , and each Ti+1 is an action-derived knowledge set by applying action αi to Ti (1 i < k) as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 10.
Then T is a knowledge characteristic of I .
Proof. We prove by induction that for each i, Wi is the unique maximal k-model of Ti . From the proof of Proposition 6,
we know that Winit is the unique maximal k-model of Tinit . Assume for all i < k, Wi is the unique maximal k-model
of Ti . We need to show that Wk is also a unique maximal k-model of Tk . There are three cases we should consider:
(1) Wk = succ(Wk−1,pickup(x)), (2) Wk = succ(Wk−1,discard(x)), and (3) Wk = succ(Wk−1, stop).
Proof for Case (3) is trivial. For Case (1), there are four subcases: (1.1) the player already holds a card y in Wk−1, and the
player has not discarded any card before; (1.2) the player already holds a card y in Wk−1, but also the player has previously
discarded a card y′; (1.3) before picking up card x, the player has no card in hand, and the player has not discarded any card
yet; and (1.4) before picking up card x, the player has no card in hand, and the player has previously discarded a card y.
For Case (2), there are two subcases: (2.1) the player has two cards x and y in hand before discarding card x; and (2.2)
the player only has card x in hand before discarding x. Proofs for all these subcases are quite tedious but straightforward
following the deﬁnitions and propositions presented in this section. So we omit those details. 
6. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we examined the notion of knowledge forgetting under S5 modal logic. We provided a complete character-
ization on knowledge forgetting through four postulates, and investigated its useful applications in knowledge updates and
knowledge games.
Y. Zhang, Y. Zhou / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 173 (2009) 1525–1537 1537Many related issues remain for further study. In this paper, we only addressed the problem of knowledge forgetting in
modal logic S5. In a multi-agent system, it is more common that an agent not only needs to forget his own knowledge
due to a memory limit, but also has to forget other agents’ knowledge for various reasons. So generalizing our knowledge
forgetting to the multi-agent modal logic S5 (and other multi-agent modal logics) will be a challenge. One particular concern
we should take into account in this development is common knowledge which does not occur in single agent modal logic.
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